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Learning a Lesson from Taiwan?
A Comparison of Changes and Continuity 
of Labour Policies in Taiwan and China 
LEE Chun-Yi 
Abstract: This paper argues that the comparison of labour policies in 
Taiwan and China has an important bearing on the interaction be-
tween state and society. The fact that labour policies have changed 
over time illustrates a process of bargaining between the state and 
society. The core question of this paper is whether the development 
of labour policies in Taiwan can provide China a good example to 
learn from. In order to answer this question more systematically, the 
first part of this paper provides theoretical reviews of the state–
society relationship, while the second part aims to verify whether 
those labour-favouring policies in Taiwan have changed under a dif-
ferent party’s governance. The third part of the paper further investi-
gates labour policy in China; this section mainly focuses on the his-
torical background to the new labour contract law. Based on the pre-
ceding two sections’ literature review of the changing path of labour 
policies, the fourth section scrutinises fundamental issues reflected in 
the development of Taiwan’s labour policies, then compares how 
those issues are reflected in the case of China. The conclusion of this 
paper is that although Taiwan, like China, formerly had a one-party 
system, the changes in Taiwan’s labour policies are not completely 
comparable to China, though both societies had some similarities. 
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Introduction 
Since 2000, Taiwan has twice experienced party alternation in presi-
dential elections – in 2000 and in 2008. This topical issue addresses 
the question of what changed after these party alternations. In order 
to answer this question, this paper focuses on labour issues. The rea-
son for taking this perspective is that, since the 1970s, the labour 
movement had campaigned alongside campaigns for political democ-
racy, civil liberties and self-determination of the Taiwanese people 
(Chu 1996: 498). With the establishment of the Democratic Progres-
sive Party (DPP) in 1986 and the party’s first victory in a presidential 
election in 2000, one could assume that labour interests would be 
taken into consideration by the governing party in Taiwan. However, 
many scholarly works have indicated that this might not necessarily 
be the case. Therefore the first question posed by this paper is 
whether the ability to choose between alternative parties improve the 
ability of Taiwanese workers to defend their rights and benefits. The 
struggle that Taiwanese labour has been through, to some extent, is 
the situation currently faced by Chinese workers; a second goal of 
this paper is to compare Taiwan and China in respect of their labour 
movements.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, I track the 
changes in labour policies in Taiwan over the two alternations in 
party control. Secondly, and more importantly, I compare the trajec-
tory of Taiwan’s labour movement with that of China. Taiwan started 
its democratic consolidation with the lifting of martial law in 1987, 
since which time a labour movement embedded in a broader-scope 
social movement has developed. In China, although there have been 
frequent and massive labour strikes since 2008, it is still questionable 
whether those sporadic but frequent actions could be seen as an or-
ganised movement, and whether they represent a broader social 
movement. From Taiwan’s experience, this paper aims to make some 
suggestions about the current labour struggle in China. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: the first part provides 
theoretical reviews of the state–society relationship; the second part 
aims to verify whether labour policies in Taiwan have changed under 
the different parties’ governments. The third part of this paper aims 
to further investigate labour policy in China: this section mainly fo-
cuses on the promulgation of the new labour contract law, and the 
government’s suppression of independent labour organisations. 
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Based on the preceding two sections’ review of the changing paths of 
labour policies, the fourth section scrutinises fundamental issues re-
flected in the development of Taiwan’s labour movement, then com-
pares how those issues are reflected in the case of China. The fifth 
part concludes that although Taiwan and China share a certain degree 
of similarity in terms of their state-controlled trade unions, the ex-
perience of the labour movement in Taiwan might not be comparable 
to that in China.  
Dynamics of the State–Society Relationship  
Starting from Fascist Italy’s economic framework known as the “cor-
porate economy” (Spirito and Volpicelli were the leading theorists of 
the “corporate economy”; see Gramsci 1971: 257), Philippe Schmitter 
(1974) revived this notion as “corporatism” after the Second World 
War. Schmitter detached corporatism from fascism and generalises 
corporatism as a “system of interest representation”. To be sure, 
corporatism refers to both democratic and undemocratic systems. As 
Unger and Chan defined it,  
a polity can contain corporatist elements and at the same time be a 
dictatorial Communist Party regime or an authoritarian Third 
World government, or a liberal parliamentarian state (Unger and 
Chan 1995: 31).  
In democratic countries, such as Australia, Britain or Japan, the lead-
ers of national associations are beholden to their membership, not 
the state. There is an institutional bargaining status among different 
associations that allows different group interests to be negotiated. 
Therefore, the state may not necessarily be involved: this is also de-
fined as societal corporatism. However, for most post-communist or 
authoritarian states, corporatism refers to more top-down control by 
the state, in accordance with Schmitter’s definition of state corporat-
ism:  
State Corporatism tends to be associated with political systems in 
which subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic 
power; elections are non-existent or plebiscitary; party systems are 
dominated or monopolized by a weak single party, executive au-
thorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited 
and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, 
language, or regionalism are repressed (Schmitter 1974: 105). 
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More importantly, as Spirito and Volpicelli pointed out, a significant 
characteristic of state corporatism is order and harmony (Gramsci 
1971: 257). It is no surprise, therefore, that the Chinese government 
placed so much emphasis on the “harmonious society” during Hu’s 
era (Zheng and Tok 2007). If I would interpret this from the perspec-
tive of a corporatist framework, the undertone of “harmonious soci-
ety” actually refers to a more forceful control of social organisations, 
for the purpose of strengthening social order and harmony. 
Scholars tend to classify the interaction of state and society in 
both Taiwan and China under the paradigm of state corporatism. 
This is because Taiwan was under the Kuomintang’s (KMT, Guo-
mindang) tight control for over five decades (from 1949 to 2000), 
while in China the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is still the only 
party, and the division between party and state is often unclear there. 
However, a theoretical question raised in this paper is, now that party 
control has alternated twice in Taiwan, can state corporatism still be 
used to describe state–society interaction? In the case of China, the 
CCP is the only party, and usually represents the state, while the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the only legally rec-
ognised trade union in China. Can we argue that China fits all the 
parameters of state corporatism on this basis?  
Empirically, Taiwan has experienced an authoritarian period under 
the KMT’s control, and yet the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions 
(TCTU), which was established in 2000 as the voice of Taiwan’s la-
bour force, though small, has at least started to take part in negotia-
tions with policy makers. What can China learn from the Taiwanese 
example? Taiwan’s democratic transition resulted from the cumula-
tive effect of long-term efforts by social movements, including labour 
strikes, to bring down the KMT’s authoritarian control. The Taiwan-
ese labour movement had a similar experience of being controlled by 
one trade union, the Chinese Federation of Labour (CFL), which did 
not represent workers’ rights or their will, as is currently the case with 
the ACFTU in China. Therefore, the two power alternations in Tai-
wan have not only had a great impact on Taiwan’s society, but have 
also had implications for China.  
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Taiwan’s Experience: Breaking away from State 
Corporatism 
There has been considerable discussion about the nature of the rela-
tionship between Taiwan’s labour movement and democratisation. 
One could argue that many events have marked Taiwan’s democrati-
sation, such as the first presidential election or the first party alterna-
tion in 2000. I argue that the lifting of martial law in 1987 is the first 
milestone of Taiwan’s political opening and the starting point of dem- 
ocratisation. Chu (1996: 497) pointed out that workers in Taiwan 
have only played a marginal role in pushing democratic transition. 
Following the same thread, Huang (2002: 307) clearly argued that 
democratisation brought about the labour movement, not the other 
way around. Both authors refer to the fact that Taiwanese workers 
maintained a low profile in urging the government to lift martial law. 
In the years that followed, however, successive industrial actions 
forced the Taiwanese state and employers to pay more attention to 
workers’ rights (Chu 1996: 498; Huang 2002: 307). Many scholars 
who work on labour movements in Taiwan argue that the state–
society relationship in Taiwan fits into the state corporatism paradigm 
(Unger and Chan 1995; Chu 1996; Ho 2006; Wang 2010). The main 
reason for this argument is that Taiwan was under the KMT’s authori- 
tarian control, as the main characteristic of state corporatism is the 
top-down relationship. In this relationship, the state plays a dominant 
role in interacting with social groups. How does the state dominate 
these interactions? According to Schmitter, corporatist states act 
more cautiously and “understandingly” towards the interests of pro-
ducers and owners (Schmitter 1979: 38). In other words, corporatist 
states’ reactions to different interest groups’ demands are different. 
To elite groups, corporatist states are more willing to accommodate 
their requests in order to incorporate them into the state system; to 
labour or peasant groups (powerless groups), corporatist states might 
apply ruthless suppression. Therefore, power asymmetry is reflected 
in the actions of corporatist states. In order to understand how the 
state controls (or incorporates) labour groups, we look at state con-
trol both in Taiwan and in China during the authoritarian period.  
In Taiwan, state corporatism was characterised by two layers of 
control. The first layer was at the workplace level, where individual 
labour unions were closely monitored by the KMT, while the officials 
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of those individual labour unions were all loyal KMT members, to 
ensure that the management of union affairs followed the KMT’s 
instructions. The second layer is at the national level, where the CFL 
was the only legitimate trade union of Taiwan. It is clear that during 
the authoritarian period, this two-layer control by the party was in-
tended to ensure two separate but interrelated goals: political stability 
and economic development (Chen, Ko, and Lawler 2003: 317).  
Huang (2002: 312) agrees that labour representation was monop-
olised in Taiwan, and the union structure had a corporatist outlook, 
which means the KMT seemed to control all the individual unions. 
However, Huang argued that the state-sponsored union in Taiwan 
did not have the ability to articulate working-class interests or the 
means to discipline its member unions. More importantly, as Huang 
argued, wages and employment conditions are not regulated by any 
corporatist arrangement. However, Huang also agreed that, in state 
corporatist environments, institutions are not created asymmetrically; 
that is, the state has a fairly prescriptive top-down design for institu-
tions, so both employers’ and workers’ organisations are influenced 
by the corporatist structure, and class conflict under state corporat-
ism is stalemated (Huang 1997: 27). It is difficult, then, to observe 
any possible expression by the workers of either their rights or their 
interests to the ruling class, under state corporatism. If we go back to 
Schmitter’s original argument, we see that unions under state corpor-
atism are bound to be tightly controlled by the state, and therefore 
unable or unwilling to represent workers’ rights, because the officials 
of the unions were bureaucrats after all. Therefore, I argue that under 
the KMT’s authoritarian control, state corporatism is perhaps not 
absolutely accurate, but is the most suitable model to describe the 
state’s control over labour organisations at the theoretical level. I now 
take an empirical look at how the party-state in Taiwan controlled 
labour unions. 
The KMT controlled the unions by atomising them, restricting 
the size of unions for easier control. According to Cooney (1996: 17–
18), although the labour union law (LUL) allowed workers to form a 
union, the restriction of union size to a minimum of 30 employees, 
combined with the number of tasks that a union was required to 
perform, impaired the unions’ proper function. Ho also indicated that 
Taiwan’s industrial unions were fragmented because of the LUL’s 
requirement that industrial unions be based on the workplace. With 
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the exception of state-owned enterprises, a joint union was not per-
mitted to be established even under the same owner (Ho 2006: 113). 
Therefore, workers’ collective bargaining power within a small union 
is very limited. Chen et al. emphasised that the political-ideological 
control of the KMT was through fragmented unions (Chen, Ko, and 
Lawler 2003: 319). The party actively established its own political 
organisations at the factory level, not only to incorporate workers, 
but also to monitor workers in order to counter or prevent com-
munist ideology. Apart from small-sized unions, employee-based 
organisations were divided into two categories: occupational unions 
and industry unions. The logic of this distinction is that industry unions 
covered more than one occupation (Cooney 1996: 17–18). Both 
kinds of unions belonged to regional union branches, and those re-
gional unions were under the CFL. If we based Taiwanese workers’ 
ability to fight for their class interest on the rate of union member-
ship, it would be quite misleading. According to Huang and many 
others who have researched Taiwan’s trade union movement (Chu 
1996: 499; Huang 2002: 313; Chen, Ko, and Lawler 2003: 320; Ho, 
2006: 112), the reason that Taiwan has a consistently higher union 
membership rate than other countries is that the Taiwanese govern-
ment has, since the early1980s, been in the process of licensing newly 
established occupational unions. This policy allows easy access to 
government-subsided labour health insurance. Many people, in order 
to claim health insurance at a certain age, joined occupational unions, 
regardless of whether they were employed.  
Apart from gaining easy control of atomised unions, the KMT 
also encouraged the establishment of state-sponsored unions, in order 
to gain international support. Frenkel, Hong, and Lee (1993: 163) 
pointed out that, after being forced to give up its seat in the United 
Nations (UN) in 1971, the Taiwanese government was concerned 
about being isolated by the international community. Therefore, trade 
unions were a means by which the government could maintain in-
formal diplomatic relationships with other countries. However, all 
these state-supported small unions are unable to represent workers’ 
rights, as the occupational union is a tool that workers use to claim 
health insurance, and the industrial union is again a tool used by the 
party to control workers. Workers cannot depend on any of these 
tools to defend their interests, so the emergence of independent unions 
was unavoidable. According to Chu, although information about 
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autonomous unions was difficult to obtain before 1990, more than 
100 independent unions had already been established in 1988 (Chu 
1996: 500). Different forms of independent trade unions organised by 
brotherhood or kinship also emerged before 1990. Ho (2006: 114) 
indicates that in north Taiwan, some autonomous union leaders 
founded an informal Brotherhood Union (ݴᕏᐕᴳ, xiongdi gonghui) 
in 1987. A year later, a similar organisation called the Association of 
Union Cadres (ᐕ㚟ᴳ, gonglianhui) was established in the south of 
Taiwan. Ironically, although the KMT government wished to use the 
unions to link up with the outside world, a National Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions (㠚ѫᐕ㚟, zizhu gonglian) was denied legal 
status, despite being accepted as a member of the World Confedera-
tion of Labour (Ho 2006). This indicates that although the KMT 
intended to use the union for the benefit of its external relationships, 
the merit of an independent union’s being acknowledged by an inter-
national organisation counted for much less or even worked against 
the fact that it was outside the party. An independent union was more 
worrying to the KMT than an internationally acknowledged union 
during the authoritarian period. While both the Brotherhood Union 
and the Association of Union Cadres were autonomous, the reason 
that the KMT permitted them to be established was, as Cooney 
(1996: 8) explained, to use the union to achieve the KMT’s political, 
economic and diplomatic goals. Therefore, although those unions 
appeared autonomous, they were actually controlled or monopolised 
in a rather indirect way by the hegemonic power of the state (the 
KMT).   
Autonomous labour unions emerged at around the same time as 
the DPP. The establishment of the DPP in 1986 could be seen as the 
opening of the social movement era. As Wang (2010: 62) indicated, 
prior to the DPP’s establishment, workers kept a low profile in order 
to avoid police harassment or job insecurity. Therefore, the DPP 
represented the workers not only as an anti-KMT party, but as a hope 
for their voice to be heard. Ho clearly explained that there were two 
main reasons for the Taiwanese workers and the DPP to form an 
alliance. The first and most important reason was that workers dis-
liked the KMT because of its pro-business style and authoritarian 
control of the unions. The second reason is more strategic, based on 
the benefit to the DPP: the DPP saw the mass working class as po-
tential voters and it was crucial for the DPP to gain the workers’ sup-
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port (Ho 2006: 116). Of course, there could be a third, more ideo-
logical reason: because many DPP founders were opposed to social 
injustice, they aligned themselves with Taiwan’s labour movement in 
order to fight the monolithic party-state system under the KMT’s 
control. As Wang (2010: 62) pointed out, within the DPP, the radical 
New Tide faction (ᯠ▞⍱, Xinchaoliu) was the main force seeking to 
coordinate a more progressive social movement. The labour move-
ment stood out among all other social sectors and the combination of 
all the above reasons led to a close rapport developing between the 
DPP and Taiwanese workers.  
In 1984, one of the best-known autonomous labour unions, 
known as the Taiwan Labour Legal Support Association (ਠ⚓ऎᐕ⌅
ᖻ᭟ᨤᴳ, Taiwan Laogong Falü Zhiyuan Hui) was renamed the Taiwan 
Labour Front (TLF, ਠ⚓ऎᐕ䲓㐊, Taiwan Laogong Zhenxian); in 1992, 
it worked closely with the DPP. The previous face of the TLF, the 
Taiwan Labour Legal Support Association, was organised by a group 
of lawyers who provided workers with free legal advice and also took 
on workers’ lawsuits (Cooney 1996: 23). Gradually, the TLF stopped 
limited itself to providing legal consultancy for workers and aligned 
with the DPP; along with other labour activists, the TLF drafted 
various bills in relation to labour rights that were submitted to the 
Legislative Yuan by DPP lawmakers (Wang 2010: 62). Based on the 
efforts of various autonomous industrial unions, the TCTU (a na-
tionwide industrial union separate from the CFL) was established in 
2000. The establishment of the TCTU was an obvious violation of 
the then LUL, which only allowed one union federation at national 
level. However, the first victory of the DPP in the presidential elec-
tion in 2000 secured the legal status of the TCTU; this was because 
President Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) had promised during his 
campaign to acknowledge the TCTU’s legal status (Huang 2002: 317).  
One might assume that the establishment of the TCTU could also 
be seen as the endpoint of Taiwan’s state-corporatism period. How-
ever, does the establishment of the TCTU indicate that Taiwanese 
workers have more say in terms of engaging with the policy making 
process? In other words, do workers’ unions now have a stronger 
voice in Taiwanese society?  
The picture seems not to be too rosy for Taiwanese workers. Ho 
(2006: 123–125) argued that with the end of the state-corporatist 
model in Taiwan, Taiwanese workers did not gain much from the 
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establishment of the TCTU. The main reason for this is that the 
TCTU’s strategic alignment with a political party resulted in an ex-
pensive trade-off: although Taiwanese workers managed to have a 
worker-based national representative union, the TCTU lost support 
from grass-roots workers in the long term. The TCTU actively sub-
mitted many policy proposals that later became official policies; how-
ever, workers did not see these political achievements as working to 
their benefit. Furthermore, when the DPP was in power in 2000, few 
former activists from labour organisations became governmental 
officials. While one might expect they could exert their influence 
from within, their attitudes towards labour unions and actions might 
also change because of their new positions within the ruling govern-
ment (Chang and Chang 2010: 69). Even the unionised workers con-
sidered that their leaders became more detached from the grass-roots 
as they focused on their personal political careers. Apart from losing 
grass-roots support, the TCTU also faced tough competition from 
the CFL. Wang (2010: 69) indicated that on various topics, the na-
tional labour leaders of the CFL and TCTU blamed each other for 
selling out the workers. The fight became meaningless to workers 
because, apart from blaming each other, neither the CFL or the 
TCTU provided a better solution for workers’ needs. Furthermore, 
due to the conflict between the DPP and KMT in the Legislative 
Yuan, and the antagonism between Executive and Legislative Yuans, 
many labour bills were delayed. As a result, few labour laws were 
passed or amended in the DPP years (Wang 2010: 71).  
After eight years of DPP government, the KMT regained control 
of the presidential office in Taiwan in 2008. The 2008 financial crisis 
severely dented Taiwan’s export sector, and consequently heavily 
affected Taiwan’s labour market. While one might assume that the 
KMT would take a pro-business attitude to deal with the deteriorat-
ing labour market, the party actually proved to be more pragmatic. As 
Wang (2010: 77) observed, after the KMT regained power, Taiwan’s 
labour legislation experienced significant progress. For instance, the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement Act, considered the foundation of 
collective labour rights, was amended in January 2008. Thereafter, 
several laws were amended in order to protect employees’ job secur-
ity, which was especially meaningful to workers during an economic 
downturn. Although there certainly are gaps between legislation and 
implementation, the passing of those labour bills indicates that the 
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KMT does value workers’ rights and interests, particularly during a 
difficult time of economic crisis. In Chang and Chang’s (2010: 78) 
survey of public attitudes towards union power, they concluded that 
some voters supported the labour movement when the DPP was 
campaigning for the presidential election as a way of resisting the 
KMT’s one-party system. It was not clear, and perhaps could not be 
distinguished clearly, whether the voters’ support for the DPP arose 
from support for the labour movement or for the rebellion against 
the KMT regime. Based on the above debate, it is also unclear 
whether the DPP party officials wholeheartedly supported labour 
movements or used labour issues to gain votes.  
It could be argued that, after 2000, when the DPP won the first 
presidential election and with the establishment of the TCTU, the era 
of state corporatism came to an end in Taiwan. However, the ques-
tion is whether the two-party system benefits labour rights. The DPP 
has been regarded as a friend of the labour movement since its early 
period, but when it gained control of the presidential office in Taibei, 
apart from acknowledging the legal status of the TCTU, many labour 
law proposals were delayed at the Legislative Yuan because of parti-
san warfare with the KMT. The KMT, on the other hand, is tradi-
tionally regarded as pro-business. In order to secure the votes of 
workers after losing the presidential office in 2000, the KMT turned 
out to be quite effective in terms of passing collective labour bills 
after it returned to power in 2008. It is not that the KMT had better 
policies than the DPP, but the political reality is that when the work-
ers’ voice became votes for the political parties, as Wang has argued, 
the party’s commitments to labour reforms were more opportunistic 
than sincere (Wang 2010: 80). It certainly can be seen that workers 
are in a position of constantly bargaining with the political parties in 
Taiwan.  
China’s Experience: Still the Century of
Corporatism? 
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was created in 1949, it 
declared itself to be a country that would fight for workers’ rights and 
equality, and Chinese industrial workers were by and large a relatively 
privileged group within Maoist state socialism: they are a class who 
enjoy a stable, secure income, socially provided housing, medical care 
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and education, guaranteed lifelong employment, social and political 
prestige. Nevertheless, the economic structure has changed dramati-
cally since 1978, when China decided to rely on foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) as its main source of economic development.  
Some recent literature has dealt with workers’ protests at differ-
ent moments of PRC history (Walder 1991; Perry and Li 1997; 
Sheehan 1998). Some more specific literature has emphasised that the 
1989 Tiananmen Square movement was actually significant to the 
Chinese labour movement because a totally independent labour union, 
the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Federation (ᐕ㠚㚟, gongzilan), was 
established in May 1989. Although the gongzilan had a short life, last-
ing only until June 1989, its remaining members still protest and 
campaign for Chinese labour rights all over the world (Walder and 
Gong 1993). The emergence and suppression of the gongzilan has 
raised a question that has attracted scholars who are interested in 
Chinese labour studies: Are there any trade unions that represent 
Chinese labour?  
The ACFTU was inaugurated in 1953 and is the largest federa-
tion of trade unions in China, but it is a semi-official organisation and 
has been accused of being affiliated to the CCP. Many studies have 
shown the impotence of the ACFTU in representing Chinese work-
ers. However, many researchers also argue that the ACFTU is incor-
porated into the party/state system by design: it is a “corporative 
trade unionism” (Walder 1991; Chan 1993; Perry 1995; Gong 2002; 
Howell 2003). Researchers on Chinese trade unions have classified 
the ACFTU as an example of state–society corporatism, which means 
in the relationship between the ACFTU and the state, the latter plays 
an overwhelmingly dominant role (White, Howell, and Yuan 1996: 
28). Nevertheless, if we go back to the main definition of corporatism 
in our previous section, we see that corporatism, according to 
Schmitter, should be a “system of interest representation” (Schmitter 
1974). More importantly, corporatists have argued that the issue is 
more about the trade-off between the state and civic organisations. In 
this context, first of all, the ACFTU is by no means a pure “civic 
organisation”; it is a semi-official organisation. Secondly, there is no 
“trade-off” between the ACFTU and the state, it only serves as a 
one-way “transmission belt”. Supposedly, the ACFTU should speak 
for the state to mobilise workers for more production, while at the 
same time gathering workers’ views to report back to the state. How-
 Learning a Lesson from Taiwan? 57 
ever, the latter function is rather superficial (Chan 1993: 36–37). As 
Howell has indicated, the problem for the ACFTU is twofold. First, it 
is not clear whom the ACFTU should represent, the workers or the 
party. Second, it is not clear how the ACFTU should represent such a 
differentiated and diffuse workforce as that in China (Howell 2003: 
103–122). Not only did the semi-official structure of the ACFTU 
weaken its voice in front of the state; the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown 
further undermined its potential for acting as an independent trade 
union. Chan (2007: 288) indicated that the consequence of the 1989 
Tiananmen massacre was that the state tightened its control on any 
organised union, including the ACFTU, thereby undercutting the 
union’s traditional base in the state enterprises. Chan argued that the 
national political leadership increasingly accepted privatisation; ex-
amples include the SOE reform in the mid-1990s, flexibility of labour 
and integration with the global market, and the pursuit of economic 
development rather than equality. The ACFTU, under strong pres-
sure from the government, gradually accepted this reality, while low-
er-level trade union cadres had no concept of activist trade unionism. 
Consequently, ACFTU officials focused on securing their own sur-
vival instead of protecting workers’ interests. 
Since the ACFTU cannot totally represent the interests of Chi-
nese labours, while a totally independent labour organisation gongzilan 
was destroyed in the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement, some stud-
ies have attempted to analyse why Chinese workers did not organise a 
collective movement in order to improve their status. Various expla-
nations of observed patterns of sporadic contention have been ana-
lysed recently by China scholars. These explanations include griev-
ances, mobilising structures, claims, tactics, and targets of protest 
(Lee 2000, 2002; Hurst and O’Brien 2002; Blecher 2002; Cai 2002; 
Hurst 2004). From this rich literature, it can be suggested that regard-
less of which of the many forms through which the Chinese workers 
express their discontent, in terms of an organised workers’ union, the 
Party still retains tight control.  
The difficulty of establishing an alternative workers’ union lies in 
the government’s control of social organisations, and non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) in general. For most NGOs, the great-
est hurdle is registering with the government. For a long time, the 
Chinese government has applied a dual-qualification system to man-
age these organisations. Specifically, they cannot register with the 
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Ministry of Civil Affairs directly; they have to find a suitable “busi-
ness supervision unit” within the government (ᾝउѫ㇑௞ս, ye wu 
zhu guan danwei), and only after they are associated with some spon-
soring units are they allowed to register with the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs. Many NGOs cannot find a suitable bureau to become associ-
ated with, which means they cannot register with the government. 
This double-filter has impeded the development of NGOs in China 
and forced them to become underground organisations: they do not 
have legal status but they still function, while the government turns a 
blind eye. Most labour NGOs belong to this category.  
According to Lee and Shen, there are around 30 labour NGOs 
in the major cities in China (Lee and Shen 2011: 174). The main focus 
of labour NGOs is on helping workers with legal information and 
providing workers with cultural entertainment. Since most of them 
cannot register with the government using their true identities, they 
must use other titles to register their organisations; otherwise, they 
simply do not try to become registered and just remain on the gov-
ernment’s “blacklist”. “Workers need us”, according to a founder of a 
labour organisation in Shenzhen (Anonymous 1 2013). Another 
founder of a labour organisation said:  
We went to hospitals to visit injured workers and provide workers 
some places to go after their working time; for instance, providing 
them with computers to get online or broadcasting some movies. 
We were not doing anything illegal (Anonymous 2 2012). 
It seems that governments have listened to the needs of society. With 
effect from 1 January 2012, the Guangzhou municipal government 
repealed one major administrative hurdle for eight types of social 
organisations seeking to secure official registration for their opera-
tion. Known as “de-regulation of social organisations”, this was ex-
tended to Guangdong province from 1 July 2012. It means labour 
NGOs can directly register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs without 
looking for sponsorship by a “business supervision bureau”. While 
this has undoubtedly facilitated government supervision of NGOs, 
most labour NGOs also wish to “come out from the underground”. 
However, while society is relieved that the government has adopted a 
more open attitude towards NGOs, there are some signs that the 
government is failing to meet the expectations of society.  
Starting in February 2012, some labour NGOs already began to 
feel under pressure from the government. Their landlords cut off 
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electricity and water supplies to their rented offices; as a result, some 
labour NGOs became “homeless” (Zhang 2012). The situation grew 
even more serious in July and August 2012, when at least seven or-
ganisations had been forced to shut down. It is not the first time that 
government has set out to intimidate labour NGOs in China; as Mr. 
Zhang said, his institute has had to move many times in the past five 
years (Anonymous 2 2012).  
The labour NGOs in China not only need to face the govern-
ment’s tight control, they also face various other challenging issues, 
such as a lack of solidarity among labour NGOs and a lack of finan-
cial support. Despite all these issues, I argue that the major problem 
for Chinese labour NGOs is the lack of workers’ support. Labour 
NGOs are at the service of workers, so when those organisations are 
closed down by the government, why do we not hear about workers 
taking collective action to express their discontent? The main expla-
nation is that those labour NGOs have faced a dilemma whereby 
“We can provide workers legal consultancy, but we ourselves are also 
very cautious – if we are all arrested, who can help workers?” (An-
onymous 3 2014). As far as standing up for the workers is concerned, 
although the number of strikes has soared recently, especially after 
the promulgation of the new labour contract law in 2008 (Wang et al. 
2009), there is no direct proof that the labour NGOs are organising 
strikes: most wild-cat strikes in China are organised spontaneously by 
workers (Chan 2010). As for its dealings with the government, Becker 
and Elfstrom’s report indicated that labour NGOs and university 
academics did indeed have considerable input into pushing for the 
new labour contract law to be implemented in 2008 (Becker and Elf-
strom 2010: 4).  
The new labour contract law that was implemented in January 
2008 has influenced production costs and protected the interests of 
labour to some extent (Karindi 2008: 3). Nevertheless, this is not the 
first time that the Chinese government has promulgated a specific law 
to deal with labour issues. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese government 
first implemented the labour contract system, which was intended to 
transform most state workers into contract workers in order to in-
crease labour productivity and flexibility of the urban economy 
(White 1987: 367). It can be argued that through promulgating a legal 
system, the Chinese government showed that it was making an effort 
to solve the labour problem. As Wang et al. argued, the central gov-
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ernment’s concern with increasing social inequality was the main 
driver of policy innovation (Wang et al. 2009: 489). During the 
promulgation process, the government was very open to public opin-
ion. In 2006 and 2007, the government posted the text of the new 
contract law on a government website to gather public responses. 
Indeed, the response from society was substantial, and the govern-
ment even amended the new contract law three times based on public 
responses (Wang et al. 2009: 490). Nevertheless, the bottom line is 
that the new labour contract law was designed by the government 
with the purpose of preventing industrial conflicts; in other words, to 
maintain stability and order, which, as I mentioned previously, is the 
main characteristic of state corporatism. The law itself has proved to 
be protective of workers’ rights: for instance, it requires employers to 
sign written contracts with workers within a month of their employ-
ment; it grants workers who work for ten consecutive years in the 
same company/factory the right to be hired as a permanent worker; it 
encourages collective bargaining by empowering trade unions; it regu-
lates dismissal of workers to some extent (Wang et al. 2009). Despite 
the implementation loopholes and the discontent on the part of em-
ployers, the law is beneficial to workers. However, it can also be seen 
from Becker and Elfstrom’s survey that the more serious problem 
with the new labour contract law is not the content of legal regulation, 
but the process of signing a contract (Becker and Elfstrom 2010: 8). 
It is not unusual for workers to sign a contract that is blank or written 
in a language they do not speak, or for managers to incorrectly calcu-
late the workers’ social insurance required by regulations under the 
labour contract law. The large-scale Yu-Yuen strike of April 2014, 
which involved more than 40,000 workers, revealed the workers’ 
anger with the managers’ deliberate miscalculation of their social 
insurance (Lee 2014).  
In the case of China, I argue that although there have been some 
reforms of the ACFTU in various local branches, the ACFTU is still 
generally aligned with the government, which makes it an example of 
state corporatism. The emerging number of grassroots NGOs and 
the labour contract law of 2008 originally provided hope that there 
might be some opposition force to state corporatism. Nevertheless, it 
has to be clearly understood that the new contract law, as well as the 
previous contract law, are tools of the government intended to stabil-
ise the increasing social disorder arising from labour disputes. The 
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reason we are rightly mistrustful of the Chinese government’s inten-
tions is that, judging by the recent and continuous suppression of 
labour NGOs, the government shows no sign of loosening its social 
control. From the suppression of independent labour organisations 
and promulgation of the new labour contract law, it can be suggested 
that the Chinese government has been using a carrot-and-stick strate-
gy to deal with its labour issues. On the one hand, it promulgates a 
more protective policy towards workers in order to demonstrate the 
government’s good intentions of improving workers’ conditions; on 
the other hand, it continues to tightly control any social organisations 
in relation to labour issues, just in case there is any dissent against the 
government. 
Can Taiwan’s Experience Provide some
Lessons for China?
Schmitter (1979: 41) noted that countries are locked into state corpor- 
atism in the earlier stage of development, when the following condi-
tions are more likely to be found: an asymmetric dependence between 
social groups and the state, unauthentic and fragmented representa-
tion of social groups, weak associational loyalties, suppressed or ma-
nipulated conflict, little mutual respect among groups, no effective 
means of appealing to wider publics, and pervasive state bureaucratic 
control. Under these conditions, it is difficult for a country to move 
naturally towards societal corporatism.  
Based on this argument, I challenge Chen et al.’s (2003: 318) 
suggestion that since the lifting of martial law in the mid-1980s, the 
industrial relation system in Taiwan has been transformed and the 
Taiwanese system moved toward societal corporatism. I argue that 
the lifting of martial law can be viewed as an end of state corporatism 
in Taiwan, but from the labour movement’s perspective, the indus-
trial relationship in Taiwan has not moved totally toward societal 
corporatism. As I indicated in Section 2 of this paper, workers’ voices 
do not seem to have been heard much in the promulgation of labour 
policies after 2000, even after the establishment of the independent 
TCTU. The interests of Taiwanese labour seem to be the subject of a 
tug-of-war between the two political parties in Taiwan. The im-
portance of establishing an independent trade union is considerable, 
but somehow it lost its meaning, insofar that the TCTU, due to its 
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strategic concerns, had to align itself with a political party after it was 
established, thereby trading away its grass-roots support. TCTU be-
came another CFL, a labour organisation supporting a more govern-
mental mentality. In this process, what lesson can Taiwan share with 
China?  
It is understood that the labour movement in Taiwan flourished 
after the lifting of martial law; therefore, Taiwan’s case probably can-
not be the best illustration of a total regime change being brought 
about by a labour movement. As Ho (2010: 6) indicated, in benefiting 
from the fruits of economic modernisation the new members of the 
middle class played an important role in the new social movements. 
Medical doctors, journalists, college professors and lawyers were all 
instrumental in establishing pioneer social movement organisations. 
As mentioned above, the Taiwan labour legal support association was 
organised by a group of lawyers to fight labour-related lawsuits. This 
constitutes an autonomous civil society in Taiwan. It is because of 
this group of people pushing for change in society that the labour 
movement of Taiwan is embedded within this larger social movement 
background.  
The absence of backing from a group of people seeking to 
change society, or at least of a sufficiently powerful group, may be 
one of the factors that limit China’s struggling labour movement. 
Apart from the one-party system, I suggest that one reason that this 
pro-social-reform group is not strong enough in China is that differ-
ent social groups have different degrees of common interest with the 
state. It is difficult for social groups to work together if their interests 
are deeply rooted in the state. I can use academia as an example, given 
that this is supposed to be the group that will exercise independent 
thinking, despite the state’s control. However, after the CCP came so 
close to losing control in 1989, it tightened its grip in every sense, 
especially on the intelligentsia. Intellectuals could enjoy limited free-
dom as long as they adhered to the concept of political correctness, 
which was defined by Deng Xiaoping’s “four cardinal principles” of 
Marxism-Leninism, socialism, leadership of the party, and democratic 
leadership of the people (Guo 2003: 13, citing Chang 1988: 45–50). It 
can be argued that, since the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement, 
Chinese intellectuals have been gagged by these four cardinal prin-
ciples. Beja summed up their behaviour and public activity as follows:  
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Scholars and Professors would be allowed to raise their academic 
level, to take part in symposiums and conferences abroad, to do 
research in a foreign university. But they would do so on the con-
dition that they not try to revive the organisations that they had 
created in the eighties, whose goal was to push for the transfor-
mation of the regime, and, obviously, that they not try to link with 
the disgruntled portions of the population to help them translate 
their discontent into political demands (Beja 2006: 62).  
It can be argued that in academia, after the 1989 movement, the 
mainstream of revolutionary scholarship was crushed; however, the 
battle has not been completely lost. As Zheng and Tok observed, 
there is a group of scholars who care more about social inequality, 
income redistribution, sustainable development and education reform 
than economic development. This group of scholars have been la-
belled as the New Left (Zheng and Tok 2007: 11). It is debatable how 
much power this group of scholars has to initiate change. They have 
to compete with other camps of intellectuals who fully support eco-
nomic development and the party’s leading principles. More im-
portantly, no matter which camp the intellectuals belong to, it is more 
acceptable to seek “reform within the structure” (億ࡦޗ᭩䶙, tizhi nei 
gaige), even within the New Left. 
Another example is private entrepreneurs, who are no longer in a 
position to oppose the state. Ideologically, the CCP is opposed to 
capitalists. Pragmatically, however, since the 1978 opening of the 
economy, Deng Xiaoping decided to put an end to class struggle and 
mass movements, but to find a solution for mass poverty. According-
ly, Deng redirected the country’s energy into pursuing economic de-
velopment and promoting private entrepreneurship (Guo 2003: 10). 
The party-state provides various opportunities for private entrepre-
neurs to be embedded in the state (Chen and Dickson 2010: 38–39). 
Along with the economic reform in 1979, the Chinese state also under- 
went a process of decentralisation, both devolution of power and 
fiscal decentralisation (Lee 2011: 22). The purpose of fiscal decentral-
isation was to boost local innovation and spontaneity (Hsu 2004); in 
other words, to open the gate for local officials to attract foreign 
investment or foster domestic entrepreneurs as much as possible, as 
long as it was in the service of fruitful economic development. How-
ever, the de facto fiscal decentralisation that also consolidated China’s 
economic trajectory has not only been designed by the central gov-
ernment but also by local officials. More importantly, many local 
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officials under this practice have acted more like entrepreneurs than 
like organs of the state (Oi 1995). It can be suggested that the distinc-
tion between the state and entrepreneurs has become more and more 
blurred during this process.  
I can see that it is difficult, if not impossible, for these two 
groups (academics and entrepreneurs) to call for any change of the 
state, mainly because their interests are closely linked with the state. 
As argued above, the other two minority groups – peasants and 
workers – were, in the Maoist era in China, the “masters” of society. 
However, when China entered the era of Deng’s economic reforms, 
the status of workers and peasants in society also changed. Peasants 
and workers are no longer the “masters” of the state any longer, as 
they were deprived of their privileges during the process of the mar-
ket-oriented economic reform. As Tilly pointed out, while rich and 
powerful groups are constantly mobilising to take advantage of new 
opportunities to maximise their interests, the poor can rarely afford 
to do so because the group with fewer resources has little opportunity 
to do anything other than cope with their daily life (Tilly 1978: 75). I 
have already discussed the workers’ group in this paper; scholarship 
about the peasants’ group has revealed that peasants’ strikes actually 
indicate they are “unusually attentive to signals from the state” 
(O’Brien 2002: 154). Peasants’ strikes are usually aimed against local 
officials, as local officials are the front-liners who impose taxation, or 
work closely with property developers. O’Brien and Lee (2006: 4) 
classified strikes in the Chinese countryside as “rightful resistance”. 
No matter how many strikes or visits to the central government in 
Beijing (к䁚, shangfang) are launched by those “unruly people” (࠱≁, 
diaomin) or “nail-like individuals” (䠈ᆀᡦ, dingzihu), this is still a mat-
ter of “critique within the hegemony” (O’Brien and Lee 2006: 5). 
Certainly, the purpose of rightful resistance is to call for a change in 
unreasonable policies. However, O’Brien and Lee (2006: 128) also 
cautiously point out that “rightful resistance” possesses the elements 
of accommodation and resistance. Rightful resisters demand reform, 
but reforms within the existing structure of the state. In other words, 
although the peasants might make more noise than the intelligentsia 
and entrepreneurs in the society, their demands do not aim to reform 
the state, but to call the state’s attention to their grievance. It is not 
very different in nature from the “New Left” intellectuals: peasants 
also seek “reform within the structure” (億ࡦޗ᭩䶙, tizhi nei gaige). 
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Academia, private entrepreneurs, peasants and workers do not 
represent all the social classes in China; however, they are the main 
components of its society. Power asymmetry is mentioned in our 
previous analysis in relation to the corporatist state’s reaction to dif-
ferent social groups, and it can also be seen in the Chinese govern-
ment’s reaction to these four representative social groups. As one 
labour organisation’s leader in Guangzhou said:  
We have to work with the government, because only by working 
with them we might have some space to survive. We can then see 
into the ways to enlarge this space, see how we can benefit work-
ers more (Anonymous 4 2013). 
His point is about the typical characteristic of “trading-off” between 
the social group and the state. However, an unanswered question 
remains: under the model of state corporatism, the great asymmetry 
of power between the state and social groups, how can the labour 
movement best use the “trading-off” space with the government to 
benefit workers’ rights?  
Conclusion 
Do Taiwanese workers have more resources than their Chinese coun-
terparts in interacting with the state? After almost three decades of 
struggle with the state since the lifting of martial law, we can say that 
at least workers in Taiwan have their precious vote, to choose be-
tween political parties. The power alternation in Taiwan certainly 
benefits Taiwanese labour, at least at the legislative level. However, by 
tracking Taiwan’s labour movements before and during the party 
alternation, in comparison to Chinese labour’s struggles, we can reach 
two main conclusions. 
Firstly, although the TCTU has been criticised for lacking grass-
roots support in the long term, the fact that labourers represent votes 
to the political parties means that both political parties in Taiwan 
have made efforts to win over workers’ support. A game of political 
tug-of-war is currently underway between the KMT and the DPP 
over passing labour-related bills in the Legislative Yuan, and it is 
questionable how sincerely either political party wishes to be at the 
service of workers. However, the fact that more labour-related bills 
were passed under the KMT government after 2008 indicated that 
workers’ voices can be heard, at least at the legislative level. 
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Secondly, it is important to note that the workers’ movement in 
Taiwan did not trigger democratisation; it was the other way around. 
It can be inferred from this fact that the labour movement in Taiwan 
flourished in a more open society. Therefore, one has to be cautious 
about comparing the Taiwanese labour movement’s experience with 
that of the Chinese, in that China is still under a one-party system. 
Despite the rapidly increasing number of strikes, especially since the 
implementation of the 2008 new labour contract law, it would be 
overly optimistic to assume that those industrial actions will bring 
about regime change. The point of comparison focuses more on 
whether Taiwan’s labour movement, which was embedded in a 
broader social movement, can offer a mirror to China’s current social 
struggle. I argue that labour is not a single actor in society. In Taiwan, 
from the end of the 1980s, a section of the middle class formed a 
rather dynamic civil society, to promote different voices from the 
government. This is the backbone of the labour movement in Tai-
wan. In China, on the other hand, although we have seen some inde-
pendent labour organisations, and also some New Left intellectuals in 
academia, the entrepreneur and peasant groups in China are rather 
weak and lack the willingness to call for any reform of society. While 
these four social groups cannot represent the whole society, they are 
the main social groups in most societies. In general, the social groups 
in China have not been able to initiate rather organised movement at 
this stage, mainly because they all have different but deep-rooted 
common interests with the state. This is why it is difficult for differ-
ent voices from the state to be heard in China, as the government has 
been using carrot-and-stick strategies in different forms and at differ-
ent levels.  
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